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FDA APPROVAL OF DRUGS AND
DEVICES: PREEMPTION OF
STATE LAWS FOR “PARALLEL”
TORT CLAIMS
MARCIA BOUMIL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court’s important ruling in Mutual Pharmaceutical
Co., Inc. v. Bartlett1 concerns whether the Food and Drug Administration’s
(“FDA”) approval of a generic drug insulates the drug manufacturer from
liability under state tort laws from claims of injury due to an alleged
“design defect.”2 The Court previously ruled that FDA approval does not
preempt state law claims based upon failure-to-warn, at least with respect to
brand name products.3 In contrast, the Court previously ruled that the
federal regulatory process leading to FDA approval of generic equivalents
of brand drugs—and designation of the drug label—does preempt state law
as to claims that challenge the warnings that accompany generic drugs.4
Thus, generic manufacturers are held immune from liability under state law
for product liability, at least as to alleged failure-to-warn of adverse
effects.5 This is primarily because generic drug manufacturers have no
control over the drug label, which the FDA established in consultation with

Copyright © 2015 by Marcia Boumil.
*Professor of Public Health and Community Medicine, Tufts University School of Medicine,
Boston, MA.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
2. See id. at 2470 (holding that federal law preempts state design regarding generic drug
adequacy of a warning in design-defect liability).
3. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (concluding that the plaintiff’s state law
failure-to-warn claim was not preempted by defendant’s federal-law obligations and that
Congress’ purpose was not obstructed).
4. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011) (holding that the federal drug
regulations for generic drug manufacturers preempt the state-law claims that conflict with those
regulations).
5. See id. (holding that where federal drug regulations directly conflict with a duty to warn
imposed by state law, the state law will be preempted).
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the brand manufacturer.6 In Bartlett, however, the issue was not failure-towarn, but rather the design of the generic counterpart.7 Although the active
ingredients are chemically equivalent, a generic is not an identical drug.8
The plaintiff in Bartlett alleged that the generic equivalent, also approved
by the FDA, was flawed by a design-defect that made it unsafe for sale
under state law.9
In each of these cases, the underlying issue has been whether the
federal regulatory process leading to FDA approval of drugs and medical
devices “preempt” state laws as to the safety issues addressed through the
approval process. Thus, to summarize the applicable law prior to Bartlett,
the Court had upheld failure-to-warn10 claims against the brand
(preemption denied) but denied failure-to-warn11 claims against the generic
(preemption upheld); the Court has also denied device manufacturers’
liability for most product liability-related claims12 (preemption upheld)
pursuant to a specific statutory provision.13 By a vote of 5-4, Bartlett has
now denied liability of generic manufacturers on the basis of designdefect.14 Following the Supreme Court opinion, however, the FDA set
forth its agenda, which includes proposing a rule that would allow generic
drug makers to revise their drug labels.15 If created and adopted, this rule

6. See id. at 2574–75 (stating that the FDA regulates warning labels).
7. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470 (explaining the design-defect cause of action against the
generic manufacturer, and the inherent problems with such a cause of action).
8. See
Facts
About
Generic
Drugs,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understan
dingGenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2012) (noting the differences between
generic and brand name drugs, which include variations in inactive chemical ingredients and rate
of absorption).
9. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471–72 (referencing the plaintiff’s design-defect claim); see
also PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572 (framing the question as whether or not the federal drug
regulations preempt state law claims).
10. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (allowing the state failure-to-warn claim
as supported by the history of co-existence between state and federal law and the FDA’s
recognition of state law remedies).
11. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2571 (holding that the federal regulations applicable to generic
drug manufacturers preempt state law claims).
12. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (finding that manufacturer
liability for state product liability claims are preempted to the extent that the state law
requirements are different from, or in addition to the federal requirements).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting the imposition of state law requirements
different from, or in addition to federal law requirements); see also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (noting
that state law requirements are preempted to the extent that they are different from, or in addition
to federal requirements).
14. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2469, 2470 (holding that state law design-defect claims based
on the adequacy of the warning label are preempted).
15. See Alexander Gaffney, FDA Proposes Groundbreaking Overhaul of Generic Drug
Labeling
Regulation,
REG.
AFF.
PROF.
SOC’Y
(Nov.
11,
2013),
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could again alter the landscape of liability for generic manufacturers.16
Further, the related issue (which is still unresolved by the high court and is
the subject of a split among the circuit courts)17 is whether FDA approval
of medical devices preempts all state law actions, thus insulating device
manufacturers from product liability claims under all circumstances.18 This
Article will address each of these issues, as well as the related issue of
whether off-label use of FDA-approved medical devices give rise to
liability.19
II.

BACKGROUND

The FDA, pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act20
(“FDCA”), is charged with the oversight of pharmaceutical and medical
device production, sales, labeling, and marketing.21 Pursuant to the FDCA
mandate, the FDA follows a rigorous approval process for new drugs and
devices that requires each product to be tested for safety and, in the case of
drugs, efficacy of each intended use.22 A New Drug Application (“NDA”)
requires the manufacturer to submit reports of its clinical investigations,23
non-clinical investigations to the extent relevant, and “any other data or
information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the

http://www.raps.org/regulatoryDetail.aspx?id=9625# (describing the agenda following the Bartlett
decision as including a proposed rule for generic manufacturers to apply for a labeling change).
16. See Justin Hakes, U.S. Chamber Decries FDA’s Proposed Rule on Generic Prescription
Drug
Labeling,
BUS.
WIRE
(Nov.
8,
2013),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20131108005889/en/U.S.-Chamber-DecriesFDA%E2%80%99s-Proposed-Rule-Generic#.VBDl8PldWWY (citing concerns that the proposed
rule would allow a flood of litigation against generic drug manufacturers).
17. Cf. Messner v. Medtronic, Inc., 975 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (unpublished
opinion) (explaining that the Supreme Court did not delineate what state parallel claims would
survive preemption, and that the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and possibly Eighth Circuits, have allowed
parallel state law causes of action for certain violations).
18. See Alton v. Medtronic. Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1084 (D. Or. 2013) (discussing the
issue of whether or not all parallel state law claims are preempted by FDA approval of medical
devices).
19. See infra Parts IV, V.
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
21. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 393(a)–(b) (2012) (establishing the FDA’s mission as including
the oversight of regulated products, including drugs and devices); see, e.g., id. § 355(b)(1)(B)–(F)
(outlining the FDA’s oversight of new drug production, sales, and marketing); see also, e.g., id. §
360e(c)(1) (outlining the FDA’s oversight of new devices, including production, sales, and
marketing).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (detailing the application process for new drugs); see also Valley
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing the inclusion of
efficacy studies in new drug applications).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
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drug product . . . from any source.”24 The FDA employs a standard stating
that the drugs’ “probable therapeutic benefits must outweigh its risk of
harm.”25
The approval process for generic drugs follow a different path.26 In
order to expedite the approval of generic drugs, Congress enacted the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (“Hatch-Waxman”).27 Hatch-Waxman
encourages competition among generic manufacturers by allowing generic
competitors to “piggyback” on FDA-approved drugs by means of an
Abbreviated New Drug Application.28 A generic competitor must
demonstrate that its product is the chemical equivalent to the brand drug.29
With respect to pharmaceuticals, once a product is deemed safe and
effective for one or more uses, the manufacturer creates a drug label.30
The function of the drug label is to inform prescribers and consumers
through the publication of the established name of the drug, its ingredients,
indications, directions for use, and summary of its adverse effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness.31 If the manufacturer fails to provide a
complete and accurate drug label, or if the manufacturer otherwise suggests
that the drug may be prescribed or recommended for other uses not
approved by the FDA, it is considered “misbranding,” and may subject the
manufacturer to civil and criminal penalties.32 It is important to note that
manufacturers of generic drugs are prohibited from altering the drug
label.33 Indeed, approval of the generic drug can be withdrawn if the label
is changed, resulting in a “misbranding” of the drug.34

24. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (2013).
25. See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 140
(2000) (describing the FDA’s cost benefit analysis involved in approving new drugs).
26. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2471 (2013) (describing the approval
process for generic drugs, generally).
27. See id. (recounting the adoption of the Hatch-Waxman Act).
28. See Joel Graham, Note, The Legality of Hatch-Waxman Pharmaceutical Settlements: Is
the Terazosin Test the Proper Prescription? 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 429, 434 (2006) (describing
how Hatch-Waxman encourages “piggybacking”).
29. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (describing the aspects of chemical equivalency mandated
by Hatch-Waxman).
30. See 21 C.F.R § 314.50 (2013) (describing the approval of a new drug based on the FDA’s
safety determination, which also allows the manufacturer to finalize the proposed label).
31. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (e), (n) (2012) (prescribing the factors that the drug label must
meet in order to avoid being deemed misbranded).
32. See id. § 355(d) (outlining the classification of misbranding by the FDA).
33. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (noting that generic manufacturers are barred from
changing the drug label).
34. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.150(b)(10) (2014) (explaining that approval can be withdrawn if the
labeling for the drug product is “no longer consistent” with the listed drug that the abbreviated
NDA refers to).
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The FDA’s authority, which does not cover the practice of medicine,
does not, however, prevent physicians from prescribing approved drugs “off
label”35 (which means treating conditions not specifically approved by the
FDA36). Off-label use is common and, indeed, it is frequently even the
standard of care.37 As a result, the American Medical Association
(“AMA”) has consistently taken the position that “a physician may lawfully
use an FDA-approved drug product or medical device for an unlabeled
indication . . . .”38
FDA approval of medical devices follows yet a different process. The
FDCA, and specifically its Medical Device Amendments, classifies medical
devices as Class I, Class II, or Class III, depending upon the potential risk
or anticipated misuse or injury that may result from use of the drugs.39
Class III devices are those marketed as life-supporting devices or any other
device that may cause an unreasonable risk of illness or injury, and
therefore require the greatest scrutiny.40 While most Class I and II medical
devices do not require FDA approval prior to marketing, Class III devices
require substantial oversight and are subjected to a rigorous pre-marketing
approval process conducted by the FDA before they may be sold.41
Despite the rigor of the FDA process, approved drugs and devices
nevertheless sometimes cause injury. It is estimated that 10.2% of drugs
approved by the FDA between 1975 and 1999 have either been assigned a
35. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. Thus, while the FDA prohibits a manufacturer
from promoting a drug for an unapproved indication, once a drug is FDA-approved for at least one
indication and is placed into interstate commerce, medical providers are free to prescribe it for any
purpose, regardless of its labeling, subject only to professional standards. See United States v.
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152–53, (2nd Cir. 2012). When a drug is used for a condition or in a
manner that deviates from that described in the FDA-approved drug label, the use is considered
"off-label." This includes use of the drug to treat a different medical condition or disease, as well
as use in a dosage or route that deviates from that described in the approved label. See infra note
37 and accompanying text.
36. See Michael D. Green & William B. Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of
Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2133 (2000) (noting that physicians are permitted to
prescribe drugs for off-label uses); see also Christopher M. Wittich et al., Ten Common Questions
(and Their Answers) About Off-label Drug Use, 87 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 982, 983 (2006)
(explaining that physicians frequently prescribe off-label drugs).
37. See Wittich et al., supra note 36 (explaining that physicians frequently prescribe off-label
drugs).
38. Statement, Am. Soc’y of Hosp. Pharm., ASHP Statement on the Use of Medications for
Unlabeled
Uses
(1992)
(on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.ashp.org/DocLibrary/BestPractices/FormStUnlabeled.aspx.
39. See 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1)–(2) (2014) (defining what makes devices Class I, II, or III,
differentiated by level of risk).
40. See § 860.3(c)(3) (defining Class III devices as those where the device is life-supporting
or life-sustaining, or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of
human health, or if the device presents a potential reasonable risk of illness or injury).
41. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 316–17 (2008) (explaining the different
classes of devices); see also 21 U.S.C. § 860(a)(1)(A) (2012).
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black box warning (denoting a severe safety risk), or have been withdrawn
from the market entirely. 42 In some cases, it was determined that the FDA
was provided with inaccurate or incomplete data from the drug trials.43 In
other cases, either unanticipated side effects occurred, or known side effects
occurred to an unanticipated number of patients.44 In still other cases, the
efficacy was less than expected or unacceptable in light of the risks.45
Similar safety issues plague FDA-approved drugs that remain on the
market, as more than 100,000 consumers are killed every year as a
consequence of medical devices and pharmaceutical use.46
The question has long been debated as to whether the federal
regulatory process leading to FDA approval of drugs and devices
“preempts” state law, thus foreclosing product liability actions that
challenge drug safety and/or the reasonableness of their warnings.47 While
the FDA can withdraw approval of a dangerous drug or device—or issue
other mandates—the law does not provide a private right of action to a
consumer injured by an approved product.48 The arguments in favor of
FDA preemption are not without some appeal: the role of the FDA is to
impose uniform standards for drug and medical device safety; without
preemption, court decisions by individual states could undermine the
FDA’s regulatory framework by potentially creating conflicting standards

42. See Daniel Kazhdan, Other Developments in Intellectual Property: Wyeth and PLIVA:
The Law of Inadequate Drug Labeling, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 893, 904 (2012) (citing a 2002
study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association describing the statistics of
serious warnings and market removals).
43. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 343 (2001)
(explaining that the plaintiffs contend that the petitioner made fraudulent representations to the
FDA in order to obtain approval).
44. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 592 A.2d. 1176, 1179 (N.J.1991) (stating that the
package contained no warning of the potential side effects of tooth discoloration).
45. See Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Fed. Food & Drug Admin., 501 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (holding that the FDA’s rejection of a new drug was proper because evidence
supporting the drug’s efficacy did not meet statutory standards).
46. See Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients,
279
JAMA
1200,
1202
(1998),
available
at
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=187436
(estimating that in 1994, approximately 106,000 deaths in the United States were due to an
adverse drug reaction).
47. See Bryan G. Scott & Elizabeth K. Strickland, Recent Developments in Federal
Preemption of Pharmaceutical Drug and Medical Device Product Liability Claims, THE
DEFENDER, Fall 2009, at 22, available at http://www.spilmanlaw.com/media%20content/mediacontent/documents/preemption-developments.pdf (noting the debate over the past few years over
the interplay between state tort laws, and federal regulation of pharmaceutical drugs and medical
devices).
48. See Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress did not
intend, either expressly or by implication, to create a private cause of action under the FDCA).
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that intrude on the FDA’s authority.49 Fifty different state courts could
establish conflicting standards to determine whether drugs approved by the
FDA were safe and effective.50 By vesting the FDA with exclusive
enforcement authority, federal law would impose uniform standards to
regulate the safety and efficacy of products, despite local rules.51 Federal
law also serves to discourage lay juries from making independent
determinations about safety.52 Presumably, exclusive FDA jurisdiction
would also prevent litigants from bringing legal action based on claims that
a certain product should not have gained FDA approval at all.53
Of course, opponents of preemption also have a compelling argument:
the FDCA does not include any private right of action.54 In the absence of
state tort laws, there would be no redress for plaintiffs who sustain severe
injuries from unsafe pharmaceutical products.55 In 2009, the U.S. Supreme
Court, after considerable oral argument and review of the legislative history
of the FDCA, determined that such a result was unacceptable.56
Addressing the issue of brand liability, the Court issued a landmark
opinion in the 2009 matter of Wyeth v. Levine.57 In Levine, a Vermont
woman brought a personal injury claim in state court after injecting the
drug Phenergan.58 The drug was manufactured by Wyeth Laboratories and
is an antihistamine, which prevents against nausea.59 Complications arose

49. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 612 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[D]rug labeling by
jury verdict undermines both our broader preemption jurisprudence and the broader workability of
the federal drug-labeling regime.”).
50. Id. at 626 (explaining that without the FDA, consumers could suffer since juries in all 50
states would be free to contradict the FDA, and that the benefit of the FDA is the conveyance of
warnings in one voice, rather than in 50 potentially conflicting ones).
51. See Jason C. Miller, Note, When and How to Defer to the FDA: Learning from
Michigan’s Regulatory Compliance Defense, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 565, 566
(2009) (explaining that federal regulations preempting state tort laws avoid the asymmetry in the
state tort systems).
52. Id. at 574 (explaining that giving FDA exclusive authority creates accountability not
afforded to juries).
53. Id. at 579–80 (explaining that Michigan has excluded the evolving list of drugs as a basis
for a liability action).
54. See PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, 601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has interpreted § 337(a) of the FDCA to mean that the federal government, and not
private litigants, are authorized to file suit for noncompliance with medical provisions).
55. See Miller, supra note 51, at 569 (explaining that only private tort litigation can offer a
remedy in the event that the FDA approves defective drugs).
56. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (concluding that Congress has repeatedly
declined to preempt state law, and that the FDA’s recent position that state tort suits interfere with
the statutory mandate is entitled to no weight).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 559.
59. Id. (noting that Phernergan is Wyeth’s brand name for promethazine hydrochloride, an
antihistamine used to treat nausea).
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from the injection, which eventually led to the amputation of Ms. Levine’s
arm.60 The plaintiff alleged that Wyeth had failed to include in its label a
description of the potential arterial injuries that could result from a
negligent injection of the drug.61 Wyeth defended on the basis that its label
included FDA-required and approved warnings, and that such FDA
approval preempted state law tort claims for failure-to-warn.62
The Levine jury awarded damages after finding the label, despite
approval by the FDA, to be insufficient under local tort law.63 The Supreme
Court of Vermont affirmed, concluding that FDA requirements “merely
provide a floor, not a ceiling” for state regulation.64 Thus, states are
entitled to require more stringent measures for labeling drugs as long as
they are not inconsistent with the FDA requirements.65 The U.S. Supreme
Court also affirmed, finding that state-law tort actions for failure-to-warn
against a manufacturer of a brand drug are not preempted by the FDA
approval process.66
Wyeth v. Levine stands in sharp contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
2011 decision in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing (“PLIVA”).67 There, the Court
was confronted with an alleged “failure to warn” claim where the plaintiff
sued a generic drug manufacturer under state law for inadequately labeling
its generic product.68 The plaintiff in PLIVA alleged that she developed the
(often irreversible) movement disorder, known as tardive dyskinesia,69 as a
result of taking PLIVA’s metoclopramide (the generic form of Reglan)—a
drug used to treat a digestive tract problem. 70 The plaintiff brought a state

60. Id. (explaining that the plaintiff, Levine, developed gangrene, and doctors amputated her
right hand, and eventually her entire arm).
61. See id. at 559–60 (arguing that although a gangrene warning was included on Phenergan’s
label, the label should have included a warning against administering the drug via the higher-risk
intravenous IV-push method, instead advising clinicians to use the safer IV-drip method of
injection).
62. Id. at 560 (explaining that Wyeth argued that Levine’s failure-to-warn claims were
preempted by federal law).
63. Id. at 562.
64. Id. at 563.
65. Id. (concluding that as long as federal law and state law are not in conflict, then state law
judgment is not preempted).
66. Id. at 581 (finding that state failure-to-warn cases do not obstruct federal regulation).
67. Compare PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577–78 (2011) (noting that it was
impossible for manufacturers to comply with both federal and state law, requiring state law to be
preempted), with Mensing v. Wyeth, 588 F.3d 603, 614 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding Mensing’s claim
can proceed and federal law requires such cases proceed), and Demahy v. Actavis, 593 F.3d 428,
449 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that if Congress had intended to prevent state tort law cases, Congress
would have clearly expressed that intent).
68. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2572–73.
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law failure-to-warn claim against the generic manufacturer, alleging that the
warnings accompanying the drug failed to adequately warn consumers that
prolonged use of metoclopramide could cause tardive dyskinesia.71
The case ultimately reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which denied the
plaintiff’s claim in a 5-4 ruling.72 The Court held that the FDA requirement
that generic drugs be chemically equivalent to the brand product also
prevents generic manufacturers from altering the FDA-approved label.73
Thus, the PLIVA Court found that with respect to generic drugs, FDA
regulations preempt state law and preclude failure-to-warn claims.74 To
hold otherwise would require generic manufacturers to do the impossible:
comply with FDA labeling requirements, while also complying with
various state laws by altering the label to impose stricter warnings in order
to avoid allegations of failure-to-warn.75
Levine also stands in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2008
opinion in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,76 a case that concerns whether FDA
approval of medical devices insulates the manufacturer from state law
product liability.77 In Riegel, the plaintiffs represented a class in an action
against the manufacturer of a balloon catheter, which allegedly ruptured
while in the lead plaintiff’s artery during the course of an angioplasty
procedure.78 The manufacturer of the balloon catheter had sought premarketing approval of the device by the FDA.79 The FDA’s protocol for
approval of medical devices requires increasing scrutiny, depending upon
the classification of the device.80 The catheter at issue was a Class III
medical device that required the highest level of FDA participation: pre-

71. Id. at 2570 (noting that the Plaintiffs argued that the manufacturers inadequately labeled
the metoclopramide by failing to warn of the risks of long term use).
72. Id. at 2571, 2582.
73. See id. at 2580–81 (noting that any change to the drug would require the manufacturer to
seek FDA approval).
74. See id. at 2581 (noting that because the pharmacist filled the prescription with the generic
medication and not the brand-name, the state-tort claim was preempted).
75. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (citing PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2578 (2011) (“Generic
drug manufacturers, unlike brand-name manufacturers, cannot unilaterally change their labels . . .
.”).
76. See 552 U.S. 312, 322 (2008) (noting that the Court has consistently held that FDA
approval does not preempt state tort suits).
77. Compare Riegel, 552 U.S. at 345 (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a) does not preempt
Riegel’s suit), with Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 628 (holding that state law is preempted).
78. See Riegel, 522 U.S. at 320 (noting that Riegel alleged that the catheter’s design, label,
and manufacturing violated New York common law).
79. Id. (noting the Evergreen Balloon Catheter had received pre-marketing approval from the
FDA).
80. See id. at 316–17 (noting that there are three classes, with Class III receiving the highest
level of scrutiny).
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marketing approval.81 The federal district court granted summary judgment
to the defendant on the basis that pre-marketing approval had been
granted,82 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals thereafter affirmed.83
After granting certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court found that, with
respect to devices, the FDCA—specifically including its Medical Device
Amendments (“MDA”)84—operates as the exclusive enforcement
mechanism to establish the safety of medical devices approved, pursuant to
the FDA’s rigorous regulations guiding Class III devices.85 The MDA’s
exclusivity provision that is applicable to medical devices (but not drugs)
expressly “preempts” state laws, and a plaintiff injured by a medical device
cannot look to state courts for compensation that would otherwise be
available under tort theories such as negligence, failure-to-warn, or breach
of warranty.86
Although it might appear that the issue in the 2013 Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett87 case concerning the tort liability of a
generic manufacturer would have been resolved by PLIVA, Bartlett
presented the Court with an alternative theory of product liability.88 The
plaintiff in Bartlett alleged that the drug should not have been marketed,
despite FDA approval.89 The plaintiff’s arguments rested not on the basis of
failure-to-warn, but on marketing a drug that the plaintiff claimed was
unreasonably dangerous due to an alleged design-defect.90 Neither PLIVA
nor Levine had previously considered the state law tort liability of a generic
manufacturer on the basis of design-defect.91
Before reviewing the Bartlett decision, as well as the pending cases on
the related issue of medical device liability, it is important to define two
forms of preemption that the courts distinguish: express preemption, and

81. See id. at 317–20 (noting that the catheter is a Class III device, which is the highest level
of classification).
82. See id. at 320 (noting that the Evergreen Balloon Catheter received pre-marketing
approval by the FDA).
83. Id. at 321 n.2 (noting that the Second Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s decision
granting summary judgment).
84. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2012).
85. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316 (stating that Congress passed the MDA, and included an
express preemption provision).
86. See id. at 322–23 (noting that unlike general labeling duties, pre-marketing approval is
specific to individual devices and is not an exemption from federal safety review); see id. at 324–
25 (stating that the Court has consistently found federal statutes to preempt state tort claims).
87. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
88. See id. at 2478 (observing that the plaintiff advanced the stop-selling rationale).
89. See id. (noting that Bartlett argued the stop-selling rationale).
90. See id. at 2488 (observing that the design-defect claim is for an “unreasonably dangerous”
product).
91. See id. at 2472, 2480 (noting that neither Mensing nor Levine had addressed this issue).
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implied preemption. Express preemption occurs when a statute or case law
explicitly provides for it.92 The MDA, for example, contains a specific
(statutory) provision concerning the exclusivity of the MDA and Congress’s
(arguably) stated intent that they occupy the field to the exclusion of
conflicting state laws.93 So-called “implied preemption” occurs not from
an explicit statutory pronouncement, but by implication when another
federal statute or regulation occupies the field in such a way that its
intended effect cannot be carried out if a conflicting state law is enforced.94
In this context, it is alleged that the process for FDA approval of drugs
implicitly preempts certain kinds of claims that give rise to state tort
actions.95 Specifically, those cases where a plaintiff alleges that a
manufacturer made an incomplete or fraudulent representation to the FDA
that led to its product’s approval, and the product thereafter resulted in harm
to the plaintiff (which constitutes a so-called “fraud on the FDA” claim).96
The rationale is that the FDA regulatory process “occupies the field” on this
issue, and that such claims should remain within the exclusive enforcement
authority of the FDA:97
the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it
regulates is inherently federal in character because the
relationship originates from, is governed by, and terminates
according to federal law.98
The concept of “implied preemption” thus addresses the concern that
the FDA might determine that certain mandated disclosures were complete
or adequate, only to have lay juries in state courts second-guess such
92. See Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of a State Law
Products Liability Claim, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 440 (2009) (defining express preemption as a
statutory text that prohibits state-tort law claims).
93. See id. (noting that the intent of the MDA was to preempt state tort cases that prevent
production of devices that could help those in need).
94. See Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 463, 464 (2009) (defining implied preemption as a conflict between federal and
state statutes, where the intended effect of the federal statute cannot be carried out).
95. See id. at 470 (noting that the process of FDA approval still requires costly input for
litigation).
96. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001); see, e.g.,
Michael P. Moreland, Tort Reform by Regulation: FDA Prescription Drug Labeling Rules and
Preemption of State Tort Claims, 1 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 39, 57 (2007) (noting that the suit
claimed that the manufacturer lied to the FDA, and therefore was improperly given market
clearance).
97. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352 (noting that there is clear evidence that Congress meant
that the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 be enforced exclusively by the Federal
Government).
98. Id. at 347.
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disclosures and find them insufficient under local law.99 In an undertaking
where FDA approval is the gold standard, the argument is that
manufacturers should not be held to satisfy the standards of the FDA’s
regulatory regime while also complying with every state’s individual tort
laws;100 if manufacturers are brought to state court, then manufacturers
would be subject to the unpredictability of countless jury verdicts rendered
under a spectrum of different standards.101 This argument has largely been
successful with respect to medical devices governed by the MDA, while it
has largely been unsuccessful with respect to state law negligence and
failure-to-warn claims as to FDA-approved brand drugs where there is no
analogous statute to provide immunity.102

III.

MUTUAL PHARMACEUTICAL CO., INC. V. BARTLETT
A.

First Circuit Opinion

In Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett,103 the plaintiff suffered
pain in her shoulder, and to treat this pain, she was prescribed a generic
form of the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug (“NSAID”) known as
Sulindac.104 NSAIDs are known to cause two rare but serious
hypersensitivity skin reactions that include necrosis of the skin and mucous
membranes (toxic epidermal necrolysis),105 and a somewhat less severe

99. Id. at 351 (holding that disclosures to the FDA may be deemed appropriate by the
administration, but may be judged insufficient in a state court).
100. Id. at 350 (explaining that it will be impractical for manufacturers, and will increase the
burden of manufacturers to comply with FDA’s detailed regulatory regime and the 50 state tort
regimes).
101. See id. (noting that manufacturers might be exposed to unpredictable civil liability, and
may be discouraged from seeking FDA approval for their devices).
102. Compare Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (explaining that for drug products,
Congress intended state rights of action to provide appropriate relief for injured consumers), with
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580, 2581 (2011) (holding that a manufacturer cannot
independently satisfy state duties for preemption purposes without the FDA’s permission), and
Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 584 (2013) (concluding that compliance with federal and
state duties was not possible, and impossibility preemption is inappropriate).
103. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
104. Id. at 2471. The FDA approved generic "sulindac" in 1978 under the brand name Clinoril,
followed by several generic versions after patent expiration, including one that Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. would manufacture. Id. at 2471.
105. Toxic epidermal necrolysis is a rare but severe condition where the epidermis (upper
layer of the skin) can separate from the skin. Thomas Harr & Lars E. French, Toxic Epidermal
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related condition, Stevens-Johnson Syndrome.106 When the Sulindac was
prescribed to Ms. Bartlett in 2004, the label did warn of “severe skin
reactions,” but did not specifically identify either toxic epidermal necrolysis
or Stevens-Johnson Syndrome as a potential risk.107 Both conditions,
however, were listed on the package insert as potential adverse reactions, as
was the possibility of death.108
The First Circuit noted that the trial court found “overwhelming
evidence” that Sulindac caused Ms. Bartlett to suffer Stevens-Johnson
Syndrome/toxic epidermal necrosis (“SJS/TEN”), and that as a result, she
was left permanently injured and horribly disfigured.109 Bartlett’s lawsuit
alleged that Sulindac had a defective design, and urged the court to find that
Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous under the product liability standards
that were in effect in Bartlett’s home state of New Hampshire.110 Mutual
defended on the basis that claims of design-defect are preempted under
federal law since the FDA requires the active ingredients in generic drugs to
be chemically equivalent to those in the brand.111 A jury found in favor of
Necrolysis and Stevens-Johnson Syndrome, ORPHANET J. RARE DISEASES (Dec. 16, 2010),
available at http://www.ojrd.com/content/5/1/39.
106. Id. at 2471–72.
107. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010) (explaining that
Sulindac’s label listed “severe skin reactions” under its “Warnings” section, and Stevens-Johnson
Syndrome and toxic epidermal necrolysis under its “Adverse Reactions” section), aff’d, 678 F.3d
30, 37 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
108. Id. (noting that the label listed Stevens-Johnson Syndrome and Toxic Epidermal
Necrolysis as potential adverse reactions in its “Adverse Reactions” section). Subsequent to the
plaintiff's injury in 2005, the FDA completed a comprehensive review of NSAIDs and
recommended that the label of all brand and generic forms be amended to specifically warn of
toxic epidermal necrolysis. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
109. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2012) (describing that Bartlett’s
skin lesions involved 60–65% of her body), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S.
Ct. 2466 (2013); see also Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142 (noting that Bartlett was in the hospital
for three months, spending two months in a medically induced coma, and suffered permanent
injuries, including blindness).
110. See Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34 (stating that Bartlett brought claims for breach of warranty,
fraud, negligence, design-defect, failure-to-warn, and manufacturing defect); see also Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. at 2471–72 (stating that NSAIDs, including Sulindac, were known in 2004 to potentially
cause toxic epidermal necrolysis).
111. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37. Bartlett stands in contrast to prior lower court opinions that
uniformly rejected the concept that the generic drug should not have been marketed at all. See,
e.g., Moore v. Mylan, Inc. 840 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1352 n. 14 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (noting that any
negligence claim is preempted because the plaintiff has not shown that there is a state law that
asks the manufacturer to stop producing the drug when the FDA has granted authority to do so);
Coney v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-35, 2012 WL 170143, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012)
(explaining that if a state law prohibits a manufacturer from doing what federal law explicitly
requires the manufacturer to do, it confers supremacy upon the state law); In re Fosamax
(Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 11), No. 08-008 (GEB-LHG), 2011 WL 5903623,
at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (holding that FDA statutory requirements preempts any conflicting
tort duty arising under state law); Lance v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (declining to
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the plaintiff and awarded her $21.06 million dollars in compensatory
damages.112 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict,
and Mutual appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.113
In pursuing her theory of a state-law design-defect on appeal to the
First Circuit, Bartlett alleged that Sulindac’s “risks outweighed its
benefits[,] making it unreasonably dangerous to consumers, despite the
[FDA] having never withdrawn its statutory ‘safe and effective’ designation
that the original manufacturer had secured[,] and on which Mutual was
entitled to piggyback.”114 Mutual’s appeal alleged that federal law forbids
the generic drug from altering the label.115 The First Circuit acknowledged
this basic PLIVA principle, but distinguished its finding on the basis that
Bartlett purported that the drug had a design-defect that made it
“unreasonably dangerous” under New Hampshire law.116 Thus, the First
Circuit was not critical of the fact that the label did not warn the plaintiff of
her injury; rather, the First Circuit concluded that the generic manufacturer
had not foreseen the inherent danger of such injuries and opted not to
market the product at all.117
The First Circuit’s opinion in Bartlett represented a departure from a
binding line of cases to the contrary, and Bartlett’s holding would require
that generic manufacturers be liable for injuries caused by a product that the
FDA did not deem to be unreasonably dangerous.118 The Solicitor General
argued in his amicus curiae brief that the obligation to determine the risk,
impose on manufacturers a common law duty to recall a drug in the absence of a state statute or
administrative mandate to recall a drug).
112. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 43.
113. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
114. Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 34–35 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 41.
116. Id. at 34–36 (noting that by trial date, Bartlett’s remaining theory of design-defect was
that Sulindac’s risks outweighed its benefits).
117. Id. at 41 (stating that under the current law, the original manufacturer and not the generic
manufacturer can alter the label); see also Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2472 (explaining that in 2005,
after Ms. Bartlett's injury, the FDA recommended changes to the warnings of all NSAIDs,
including Sulindac, to specifically identify toxic epidermal necrolysis as an adverse side effect).
118. Compare Bartlett, 678 F.3d at 37 (explaining that the statute contains no general
preemption provision, and that state law serves as a “complementary form of drug regulation”),
with Moore v. Mylan, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (concluding that because the
manufacturer was prevented by federal law from changing labels to conform with a state law, the
failure-to-warn claim is preempted), and Coney v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 6:11-cv-35, 2012 WL
170143 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2012) (holding that it would confer supremacy to state law if the
manufacturer is prohibited by state law from doing what federal law requires it to do), and In re
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 11), No. 08-008 (GEB-LHG), 2011 WL
5903623 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2011) (stating that federal duty preempts plaintiff’s claims), and Lance
v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (declining to impose upon a drug manufacturer a
common law duty to recall a drug, and stating that the FDA has the power to withdraw approval of
prescription drugs).
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benefit, and overall safety of drugs was within the exclusive purview of the
FDA, and that neither generic nor brand manufacturers should make
decisions about whether drugs were too risky for marketing.119 The
Solicitor General urged the Court not to impose a duty on a manufacturer to
recall a drug, either brand or generic, when it is deemed to have a designdefect.120 To do so otherwise, he argued, would interfere directly with the
authority of the FDA as final arbiter of the safety and effectiveness of
approved drugs.121
The First Circuit also reviewed Wyeth v. Levine,122 where the U.S.
Supreme Court found that state-law tort actions for failure-to-warn against a
manufacturer of a brand drug are not preempted by the FDA approval
process.123 Of course, neither Wyeth nor PLIVA addressed the issue of
whether consumers can bring claims alleging design-defect against drug
manufacturers.124 These cases are significant, however, in that the Supreme
Court clearly treated brand and generic drugs differently with respect to
product-liability claims based upon failure-to-warn.125 In its 5-4 holding,
the PLIVA Court concluded that generic drug manufacturers would be
shielded from liability on the basis that they cannot alter the drug label.126
It is notable that the First Circuit in Bartlett relied primarily on the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Wyeth, while the First Circuit largely
sidestepped the decision in PLIVA.127 Bartlett noted that although Wyeth is
“technically limited to failure-to-warn claims, its logic applies to design
defect claims as well.”128 Indeed, it opined that PLIVA “carved out an
119. Brief for Petitioner at 24, Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013) (No. 12142) (stating that Congress has vested the FDA with the responsibility to determine if a product is
safe and effective prior to entering the interstate market).
120. Id. at 28 (arguing that it would be inconsistent with the FDCA to require a manufacturer
to recall a product approved by the FDA if a jury under state tort law finds the product unsafe).
121. Id. (describing that such state-by-state considerations would undermine the FDA’s drugsafety determinations).
122. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
123. Id. at 581 (holding that the FDA’s position that state tort suits interfere with its statutory
mandate has no weight).
124. Id. at 558 (stating that the question was whether FDA approval provides a manufacturer
with a complete defense to a state tort action); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567,
2573 (2011) (explaining that the issue was whether the consumers’ claims for failure to provide
adequate labels are preempted by federal law).
125. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 (stating that a brand-name manufacturer is responsible for
accuracy and adequacy of labels, while a generic manufacturer is responsible for ensuring that its
warning label is the same as the brand name’s label).
126. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 37 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that, unlike
brand-name manufacturers, generic drug manufacturers cannot unilaterally change their labels),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012), and rev'd, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
127. Id. at 30 (noting that Wyeth resolved the conflict against general preemption, while the
Supreme Court has not extended PLIVA's exception to design-defect claims).
128. Id. at 37.
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exception to Wyeth, finding that the FDCA preempts failure-to-warn claims
against generic drug manufacturers. . . . [because] the generic maker cannot
alter the labeling . . . .”129 According to the First Circuit, Wyeth established
“a general no-preemption rule,”130 and that if a generic drug company
places a drug on the market, it incurs the potential for state law failure-towarn and design-defect claims.131
Bartlett challenges the heart of the preemption issue: PLIVA and
Wyeth were concerned that 50 different states would impose duties on a
manufacturer, duties of which would be considered to be in addition to
those duties imposed by the federal government.132 The appellate court in
Bartlett specifically commented: “it is up to the Supreme Court to decide
whether PLIVA’s exception is to be enlarged to include design-defect
claims. Given the widespread use of generic drugs and the developing split
in the lower courts, this issue needs a decisive answer from the only court
that can supply it.”133 Ms. Bartlett’s severe injuries provided a compelling
example of the damage that can be caused by adverse side effects.134
B.
1.

U.S. Supreme Court Opinion

The majority opinion

On June 24, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a vote of 5-4, found
that state-law damage claims against a generic drug company alleging that
design-defects (which are rooted in the inadequacy of the accompanying
warnings) are preempted by federal law.135 Noting that New Hampshire’s
tort law requires drug manufacturers to ensure their drugs are not
unreasonably unsafe, the Court concluded that drug safety must be
evaluated on the basis of the chemical formulation and the content of the
warnings.136 Relying upon its own recent decision in PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, where the Court found that FDA regulations prohibit a generic

129. Id.
130. Id. at 38.
131. See id. at 37 (clarifying that effective warnings and design create safe drugs, and that all
companies placing a drug on the market should be held to the same standard to ensure drug
safety).
132. Id. (finding that the Wyeth rationale does not apply because generic drug manufacturers
are legally prohibited from changing the label on drugs).
133. Id. at 38 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 34 (noting that between 60–65% of the outer skin layer on Karen Bartlett’s body
deteriorated, was burned, or became a wound, that she spent more than fifty days in Massachusetts
General Hospital’s burn unit, and that she suffered from permanent near-blindness).
135. Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2469–70 (2013).
136. Id. at 2470.
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manufacturer from altering either the drugs’ composition or label, the Court
here concluded that the Supremacy Clause renders the New Hampshire law
“without effect,” and is effectively preempted since it would require a party
to violate federal law.137
For purposes of analysis, Justice Alito, writing for the majority and
reversing the decision of the First Circuit, concluded that a solution that
only gives drug manufacturers the option to remove a product from the
market or pay for injuries is tantamount to “no solution” at all:138 “under
the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any
state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, which
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.”139 The majority
went on to conclude that even if there were no express preemption, New
Hampshire law would be impliedly preempted because it is “impossible for
a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.”140 Of
particular significance is the fact that the Court disavows any obligation to
inquire into congressional intent as to whether preemption was a desired
consequence of the regulations.141 Both Justice Breyer and Justice
Sotomayor, who authored separate dissenting opinions, substantially relied
upon evidence that the majority’s conclusion was not consistent with FDA
policy, despite the FDA’s position as articulated in its amicus curiae
brief.142
The majority relied heavily on the language of New Hampshire’s tort
143
law. New Hampshire requires manufacturers to ensure that their products
are not unreasonably dangerous.144 According to the majority, this can be
137. Id. at 2466, 2470, 2475–76 (noting that the generic drug would be a different drug if it
were chemically changed, and that it would need its own NDA to be marketed across state lines);
cf. Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578, 584 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying impossibility preemption,
as the defendant generic manufacturer could have updated its warning to match the updated
warning of the brand).
138. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
139. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
141. Id. at 2480 (rationalizing that Congress's intent can be inferred even without an outright
expression through outlined statutory duties, and that if federal law will not allow Mutual to act in
response to the demands of the state, clearly preemption was a desired consequence).
142. Id. at 2481–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that weight should not be given to the
FDA’s views on preemption because it did not hold hearings, solicit the views of the public, failed
to voice its opinion through regulations, and seems to not be able to make up its mind on the
issue); id. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion that courts are to heed an
agency’s conclusion about whether a state law is preempted, especially when its analysis does not
satisfy the “high threshold” to determine that a state law should be preempted when faced with a
conflicting federal act).
143. Id. at 2473–77, 2479, 2480 (majority opinion).
144. New Hampshire law recognizes liability for design-defect when "the design of the product
created a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user . . . " Vautour v. Body Masters
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accomplished either by modifying the product design, or by adapting the
warning label.145 To assess whether a product is unreasonably dangerous,
New Hampshire imposes a “‘risk-utility approach’ under which ‘a product
is defective as designed if the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility
of the product.’”146 In conducting that balancing test, New Hampshire
examines three factors: (1) the desirability and usefulness of the product;
(2) the ability of the manufacturer to reduce the risk without materially
affecting the desirability and usefulness of the product (including the cost);
and (3) the strength of the warnings to highlight hidden dangers from uses
that can be foreseen.147 Since redesign of Sulidnac was not an option in
Bartlett, the lower court’s inquiry focused on the ineffectiveness of
warnings as evidence of a design-defect.148
The trial court in Bartlett had devoted considerable attention to
Sulindac’s label, even allowing into evidence a Comprehensive Review of
NSAIDs that was completed by the FDA in 2005 (after the Plaintiff’s
injury), as well as the FDA’s recommendation for a change of the label.149
The change specifically included identifying toxic epidermal necrolysis as a
possible adverse effect of both brand and generic NSAIDs. 150 Indeed, a
specific jury instruction directed deliberations in which the jury would
evaluate the drug label to assess whether it was unreasonably dangerous.151
The court pointedly instructed the jury that it “should find ‘a defect in
design’ only if it found that ‘Sulindac was unreasonably dangerous and that
a warning was not present and effective to avoid that unreasonable
danger.’”152 The trial court, finding in favor of the plaintiff, based its ruling
on the jury’s determination that an inadequate label made the product
unreasonably dangerous pursuant to New Hampshire law.153 Since it was
clear to the majority that the jury verdict of “design defect” was directly

Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178, 1181 (N.H. 2001) (citation omitted). The assessment of
"unreasonably dangerous" utilizes a "risk-utility" approach, wherein "a product is defective as
designed if the magnitude of the danger outweighs the utility of the product." Id. at 1182 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
145. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474.
146. Id. at 2474 (quoting Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1182).
147. Id. at 2475.
148. Id. at 2475–76 (citing Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F. 3d 30, 41 (1st Cir. (2012))
(noting that a product is more dangerous if not paired with an effective warning).
149. See id. at 2472 (citing Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146–47 (D.N.H.
2010)) (highlighting the importance of changing the label in order to decrease its danger).
150. Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 146–47 (D.N.H. 2010).
151. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476 (presenting the jury with evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the drug is unreasonably dangerous).
152. Id. (citation omitted).
153. Id.; see also Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 151, 157 (disregarding the fact that generic
companies cannot change drug labels pursuant to federal law).
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premised upon a finding of an inadequate warning, the Court found that the
case would fall clearly within the PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing doctrine.154
Summarizing its preemption rationale, the Bartlett majority concluded
that when, as here, “federal law forbids an action that state law requires, the
state law is ‘without effect.’”155 This is what the majority identified as
“impossibility pre-emption.”156 With respect to Bartlett’s contention that
Mutual could decline to market Sulindac or pay damages, the majority was
unreceptive, rejecting out of hand what it called the “stop-selling rationale”
as incompatible with principles of preemption.157 The majority refused to
construe the law as to hold that a party had a viable option to either cease its
operation or accept liability: “Indeed, if the option of ceasing to act defeated
a claim of impossibility, impossibility pre-emption would be ‘all but
meaningless.’”158 Presumably, the Court rejected the solution suggested in
the dissenting opinions because it would relegate a generic manufacturer to
the status of a sitting duck, vulnerable to suits from any injured party and
without recourse or ability to defend itself.
The majority and the dissenting opinions found agreement on a single
point that may be significant to the future of preemption jurisprudence: Ms.
Bartlett’s injuries were tragic and devastating, and all opinions would
welcome, if not urge, Congress to resolve this preemption issue that has
“vexed the Court—and produced widely divergent views.”159 Because the
FDCA “includes neither an express pre-emption clause (as in the vaccine
context) (citations omitted) nor an express non-pre-emption clause (as in
the over-the-counter drug context) (citation omitted) . . . [the Court] is left
to divine Congress’ will . . . ”160 and resort to interpretations of statutory
and common law, about which there is fundamental disagreement.161
2.

The Breyer dissent

154. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476, 2478 (deciding that, like PLIVA, it is "impossible" for Mutual
to satisfy state and federal labeling laws simultaneously when the only remedy is to withdraw
from the market).
155. Id. at 2476–77 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
156. Id. at 2477.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011)).
159. Id. at 2480, 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 2480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 2479 (majority opinion) (rejecting the dissent's assertion that drug companies
are not legally obligated to change the Sulindac label or design, and highlighting that in terms of
common law duty and statutory law, a company can either comply, leave the market, or stay in the
market and suffer the consequences of non-compliance).
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, issued a brief but compelling
dissent. Justice Breyer criticized the majority’s conclusion that it was
“impossible” to comply with both New Hampshire and federal law, which
the majority found to be hopelessly in conflict.162 In Justice Breyer’s view,
Mutual had two options, consistent with state and federal law: (1) it could
refuse to do business in New Hampshire,163 or (2) it could incur damages
under New Hampshire law that result from injuries to consumers.164
Justice Breyer acknowledged that there was a divergence of opinion on
the preemption issue, but in his view, “[w]here the Statute contains no clear
pre-emption command, courts may infer that the administrative agency has
a degree of leeway to determine the extent to which governing statutes,
rules, [and] regulations . . . have pre-emptive effect.”165 Justice Breyer
pointed out that although the FDA contributed an amicus curiae brief on the
case, in developing its position, the FDA neither held hearings nor solicited
opinions and arguments from the public.166 The FDA also did not issue
regulations—which it could have done.167 Quoting Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hospital,168 Justice Breyer commented that an “‘agency litigating
positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or
administrative practice’ are entitled to less than ordinary weight.”169 Justice
Breyer also noted that, unlike Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, where preemption is
addressed by statute, the FDCA contains no analogous general preemption
provision with respect to drugs.170 Indeed, Justice Breyer noted that in other
contexts, the FDA has welcomed state tort law as a kind of “complementary
form of drug regulation.”171
3.

The Sotomayor dissent

162. Id. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (clarifying that compliance with federal and state
law is not literally impossible, but that the federal objective may be frustrated if a company can
only comply by withdrawing from the market or paying a sizable fee).
163. Id. at 2481.
164. Id. At oral argument, Justice Kagan commented: "the adequacy of the warning is really all
over this case. There was expert testimony about the adequacy of the warning, there were jury
instructions about the adequacy of the warning. . . . which does suggest that this is sort of within
the four corners of Mensing." Transcript of Oral Argument at 30–31, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466
(No. 12–142).
165. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (noting that the FDA's views were not entitled to deference).
167. Id.
168. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
169. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Bowen, 488 U.S. at 212–13).
170. Id. at 2482; see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
171. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 578) (2009)).
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Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, issued a
separate and blistering dissent.172 For purposes of analysis, Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent divided the operative (preemption) provision into two
major constituent parts: (a) the intent of Congress on the issue of
preemption as gleaned from other FDA contexts;173 and (b) the debate over
the so-called “impossibility” preemption, specifically in contrast to her
description of “obstacle” preemption.174
On the issue of congressional intent, Justice Sotomayor initially notes
the “conspicuous” absence of Wyeth v. Levine175 from the majority opinion,
even though Levine is clearly distinguishable on the basis of brand vs.
generic liability.176 Justice Sotomayor also points out that matters of health
and safety, traditionally subject to a state’s police powers, should not be
“superseded by a Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.”177
According to Justice Sotomayor, Levine supports the principle that
“federal drug law and state common-law liability have long been
understood to operate in tandem to promote consumer safety.”178 Levine
acknowledged that even “as Congress ‘enlarged the FDA powers,’ it also
‘took care to preserve state law.’”179 More specifically, “Congress adopted
a saving[s] clause providing that the amendments should not be construed
to invalidate any provision of State Law absent ‘a direct and positive
conflict.’”180 Finally, Justice Sotomayor emphasizes that the FDCA does
not contain any provision that would evince intent to preempt the FDA
regulations (brand or generic);181 indeed, if the FDA intended preemption,
it would have said so—just as it did with respect to medical devices.182
Concluding her opinion with legislative history, Justice Sotomayor offered
that the absence of a federal damages provision in the FDCA may, in fact,
172. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2483.
174. Id. at 2485.
175. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
176. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2483–84 (citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581) (holding that a state
failure-to-warn claim regarding a brand-name drug did not warrant preemption by federal law,
whereas Mutual Pharm. Co. focused on allowing generic drug preemption by federal law).
177. Id. at 2483 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
178. Id.
179. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567.
180. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2484 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Drug Amendments of
1962, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)).
181. Id. at 2491–92 (“[Nothing in] federal law presupposes that drug manufacturers have a
right to continue to sell a drug free from liability once it has been approved.").
182. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(2012) (including express
exemption requirements for medical devices).
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reflect Congress’s expectation that state tort law would provide for
monetary compensation to injured plaintiffs.183
Turning to the issue of preemption on the basis of impossibility,
Justice Sotomayor would require Mutual to demonstrate an “irreconcilable
conflict” concerning the state and federal provisions before concluding
there was a conflict.184 When there is a genuine conflict, according to
Justice Sotomayor, the inquiry into congressional intent is unnecessary, as
the language of the statute would make the conclusion of preemption
“inescapable.”185 Justice Sotomayor thus rejects the majority’s
“impossibility” argument, suggesting that a clear option in Bartlett was to
simply compensate the small number of consumers who are injured.186
Citing, as a starting point, a “presumption against pre-emption,”
Justice Sotomayor introduces the alternative concept of “obstacle preemption,” which is not explained or defended by the majority.187 As Justice
Sotomayor describes, obstacle preemption applies when the state law
“‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal objectives.”188
Here, the FDA’s policy was to approve Sulindac to be used for its intended
purpose.189 It was not to prevent consumers injured by the drug from
receiving fair compensation.190 Pursuant to this obstacle preemption
rationale, state law would be preempted only if state failure-to-warn or
design-defect statutes “stands as an obstacle to” making Sulindac available
for consumer use.191 Justice Sotomayor concludes by acknowledging that
Mutual’s obstacle preemption defense presents a closer question, but that it
would also fail, as it conflicts with “the purposes and objectives of the
FDCA, as supplemented by the Hatch-Waxman Act.”192
Justice Sotomayor seemed to acknowledge that her position would be
at least partially at odds with the Court’s 2011 decision in PLIVA, Inc. v.

183. Bartlett, 555 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).
185. Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963)).
186. Id. at 2489 (noting that Mutual could have complied with state requirements while also
following federal law).
187. Id. at 2486, 2491.
188. Id. at 2491 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000)
(citation omitted)).
189. See George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration's
Regulation of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 365, 388 (2003) (explaining that the main function of the FDA is to ensure that new
drugs are "safe and effective for their intended uses").
190. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 574–75, 574 n.7 (2009)).
191. See id. at 2491 (citing Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373).
192. Id. at 2493.
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Mensing,193 which she refers to as an “outlier.”194 There, the Court found
that there was “impossibility” preemption on the basis that a generic
manufacturer could not offer product warnings that would conform to
Minnesota’s duty-to-warn without altering the FDA-approved drug label. In
Justice Sotomayor’s view, however, even PLIVA does not pre-ordain the
Bartlett majority’s conclusion for the same reasons: the defendant could
choose either not to market the product, or to compensate injured
plaintiffs.195
Returning to her policy rationale, Justice Sotomayor concludes her
dissent by pointing out that Congress has not only spoken to the issue of
state law preemption in other contexts, but that Congress has also
responded “when it believes state tort law may compromise significant
federal objectives.”196 Justice Sotomayor points to state vaccination laws,
also subject to pre-market approval, to illustrate her point.197 Pursuant to
early FDA vaccination policy, once the FDA approves the vaccine,
compensation for vaccine-induced injuries was left to the states.198 In 1986,
Congress was concerned about an increase in state law tort litigation, and
thus responded by enacting a National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.199
Among Congress’s provisions was a hallmark no-fault compensation
scheme to compensate victims of vaccine-related injuries or death.200
According to Justice Sotomayor, Congress has thus demonstrated the
willingness and ability to act when it believes that state tort law operates to
the detriment of federal objectives.201 By imposing preemption in Bartlett
without congressional action, the Court leaves the intent of Congress
unspoken, and leaves injured consumers without recourse.202
C.

Analysis of Bartlett in Light of PLIVA

193. See id. at 2482–83 (recognizing that PLIVA expanded the scope of impossibility
preemption to immunize generic drug manufacturers from state-law failure-to-warn claims).
194. Id. at 2486.
195. Id. at 2489 (discussing that New Hampshire did not require Mutual to do anything other
than compensate consumers who were injured).
196. Id. at 2496.
197. Id. at 2495–96 (discussing how vaccine-related injuries were addressed largely by the
states before the enactment of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act).
198. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (2011) (discussing the history of
state run vaccine-induced injury compensation programs).
199. Id. at 1073.
200. Id. (discussing provisions within the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act that
establishes a no-fault compensation program, which allows a person injured by a vaccine to file a
petition for compensation).
201. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2496 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
202. See id. (discussing the loss that Bartlett must bear due to preemption).
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In this split decision, the 5-justice majority extended the logic of
PLIVA to claims of design-defect.203 In PLIVA, the Court had previously
found that failure-to-warn “defects” were preempted by the FDCA because
of the FDCA’s prohibition on behalf of the generic in changing the brand’s
label.204 The design of the label is part of the design of the drug, and the
failure-to-warn is a failure of the label, which is a flaw of the drug itself.205
Thus, the majority did not note a viable distinction between a label’s
failure-to-warn and a design-defect based upon the failed label.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, while thoughtful, requires that PLIVA be
repudiated.206 There is no logic that would allow PLIVA to stand and for
Bartlett to fail, and her sympathy for the case at hand doesn’t fix the gap in
logic. It is doubtless why Justice Breyer declined to join, instead deciding
to issue his own dissent that was short and pragmatic. Just because the FDA
approved a product doesn’t end the inquiry; if the product was flawed (by
design or by label) and a manufacturer chose to market it anyway, the
manufacturer should be liable for damages.207
In many respects, the “impossibility” defense is at the heart of both
PLIVA and Bartlett. It was “impossible” for the generic manufacturer to
change the drug’s label.208 Failure to adjust the label to meet state law
(New Hampshire, for Bartlett) was a violation of state tort principles.209
Ergo, there is a conflict between state and federal law, and the Supremacy
Clause dictates that federal law preempts the incompatible state law.210 The
fact that the generic might have gone back to the FDA and requested a
stronger label, or the fact that a stronger label specifically identifying the

203. See id. at 2478 (majority opinion) (citing PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567
(2011)) (explaining how the “stop-selling” argument affects the Court’s rationale).
204. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2580–81 (2011).
205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (discussing
product defect including defective labels); see also Chatnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 2d 641,
648 (S.D. Miss. 2013) (discussing the plaintiff’s claim that the drug’s “defect” is in the
information, which did not accompany the drug, and determining that these allegations can only
relate to the drug’s labeling and as such, are allegations that make up a failure-to-warn claim).
206. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
incorrectly extended its holding in Mensing).
207. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 608 (2009) (discussing the manufacturer’s continuing
obligations following FDA approval of a drug).
208. Id. at 2476–77 (discussing the majority’s holding that federal law prevents generic drug
manufacturers from changing their labels, and that when federal law forbids an action, the state
law is preempted).
209. Id. at 2475 (discussing the duty imposed on Mutual to strengthen labels based on the
state’s design-defect cause of action).
210. Id. at 2470 (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)) (discussing the
effect of the Supremacy Clause on state laws that require a private party to violate federal law).
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type of injury suffered by Ms. Bartlett was later approved is legally without
consequence; at the time of injury, neither had actually occurred.211
Having dismissed the idea that liability could be found on the basis of
an ill-designed label, either directly or indirectly, the only remaining option
for the Bartlett and PLIVA defendants would be to make a business
judgment: what is the expected (liability) cost of marketing the product as
is, and can the manufacturer charge a reasonable price in view of the
expected liability? The majority rejected this “stop selling” option as “all
but meaningless” for both PLIVA and Bartlett, concluding that if
impossibility preemption were to have any meaning at all, it would not be
to simply tell victims that there is no recourse in the law.212
The Breyer dissent, rather than attempting to distinguish PLIVA,213
quotes two former FDA commissioners, who stated that “the FDA has long
believed that state tort litigation can ‘supplemen[t] the agency’s regulatory
and enforcement activities’” in support of Justice Breyer’s conclusion that
paying damages in the nature of strict liability is a viable option.214 The
majority and two dissenting opinions seem to agree that discerning the
intent of Congress is key,215 but disagree on what Congress would
conclude.216 All agree that Wyeth v. Levine reflects congressional intent that
FDA regulation should be supplemented with state tort law, both as a check
on the federal approval process and as a means of compensation.217 The
Breyer dissent would extend the logic to generics: “Tort suits can help fill
the gaps in federal regulation by ‘serv[ing] as a catalyst’ to identify

211. See Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144 (D.N.H. 2010) (explaining that
the adequacy of warnings must be judged in light of the facts at the time of injury, without the
benefit of hindsight).
212. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477 (discussing the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that
manufacturers could comply with federal- and state- law by stop-selling the product, which the
Court found unsatisfactory); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2579 (2011)
(explaining that the Supremacy Clause does not permit an approach to preemption, such as stopselling, that renders conflict preemption all but meaningless).
213. At oral argument and in response to Justice Breyer, counsel for Bartlett argued that there
was a distinction between adequacy of the warning (not argued) and efficacy of the warning
(argued), which minimized the risk of Sulindac. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–37, Bartlett,
133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12–142).
214. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2482 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Brief
for Donald Kennedy & David A. Kessler as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bartlett, 133
S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142)).
215. Id. at 2486 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the need for inquiry into congressional
intent).
216. Id. at 2480 (majority opinion) (discussing the need for explicit resolution of the
preemption question by Congress due to divergent views on the issue).
217. See 555 U.S. 555, 574–75 (2009) (discussing congressional silence on the issue of state
tort law as evidence that Congress did not intend for FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of
ensuring drug safety).
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previously unknown dangers.”218 The majority, however, noting the
critical distinction between brand-name drugs and generics, denies that
Congress intended for the logic of Levine to extend to generic
counterparts.219 The majority concludes that the jurisprudence of
impossibility, coupled with absence of congressional activity following
PLIVA, evinces the intent of Congress that brand and generics be treated
differently.220 It may be on this point that Justices Breyer and Kagan, also
dissenting, declined to join Sotomayor, as it is impossible to reconcile the
logic of a different conclusion with PLIVA.
It is not unusual for the FDA to approve a generic drug, only to
discover latent safety issues after it has been on the market.221 Despite the
FDA’s official position as articulated in its amicus curiae brief, former
FDA commissioners Donald Kennedy and David Kessler support the
imposition of state tort liability as a means of supplementing FDA efforts to
ferret out unsafe products.222 Kennedy and Kessler cite the agency’s lack of
adequate resources to effectively police the drug market, which is part of
the FDA’s core mission.223 Opponents speculate that some state tort laws
would render the marketing of generics prohibitively expensive, which
would be complicated by complex distribution systems that make it difficult
to sell in some states but not others.224 It is doubtless that FDA preemption
of state tort claims affects cost, and a change in the law would presumably
result in a price increase for generic products.225
D.

The FDA Proposes New Labeling Requirements

218. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Bates v. Dow Argosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 451 (2005)).
219. See id. at 2480 (majority opinion) (explaining that a lack of a preemption clause leaves the
Court to discern congressional intent from the FDCA).
220. See id. (discussing Congress’ lack of activity); id. at 2478 (discussing the impossibility
issue).
221. Brief of Former FDA Commissioners Dr. Donald Kennedy and Dr. David Kellers as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (discussing that
FDA approval of a drug is not a guarantee that the drug will not cause serious adverse effects at a
later date).
222. Id. at 6 (discussing the indispensable role that state tort litigation plays in achieving the
congressional goal of the FDCA).
223. Id. at 12 (discussing the various conditions faced by the FDA that limit the agency’s
ability to singlehandedly monitor all of the drugs available on the market).
224. Brief for Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner
at 29–31, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (discussing the negative impact that state tort
laws will have on the market for manufacturing generic drugs).
225. Id. (discussing the rise in generic drug prices as a result of state tort laws).
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Just days after the Court’s decision in Bartlett, the FDA released its
most recent government agenda that includes new rules under consideration
by various government agencies.226 Included in that agenda was the FDA’s
intent to raise the issue of a revision to its labeling requirements for generic
drug makers.227 The FDA intends to publish a proposed rule that allows
generic drug makers to make changes to product labels, independent of a
brand-name manufacturer. This rule would empower generic companies to
notify consumers about safety risks and concerns they become aware of,
supporters say. In turn, it could potentially make generic drug makers liable
in court for failing to do so.228
If, in fact, the FDA does consider and issue new rules revising its
labeling requirements, such rules would be at odds with the position of the
United States as amicus curiae, which supports Mutual’s position against
FDA preemption:
The Court need not decide whether the FDCA would
preempt a “pure” design-defect claim that does not consider
the adequacy of labeling. That issue is difficult and close,
with several factors weighing in favor of finding no
preemption. The government nevertheless concludes that
the FDCA would preempt a pure design defect claim
where, as here, the claim does not require the plaintiff to
prove that the manufacturer knew or should have known of
new and scientifically significant evidence that rendered
the drug “misbranded” under federal law.229
A small point of agreement among the Bartlett parties, amici, and the
Supreme Court is that the Court’s latest ruling is to be narrowly drawn and
construed, answering only the issue of whether a judgment based upon a
design-defect claim against a generic manufacturer can stand.230 The
226. Thomas M. Burton, FDA Rule to Expose Generic Drug Makers to Liability, WALL ST. J.
(July
3,
2013,
6:41
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324399404578584142169099794.html.
227. Id.
228. FDA to Allow Generic Drugmakers to Make Label Changes Independent of Innovators,
DRUG INDUSTRY DAILY,
http://www.fdanews.com/articles/156914-fda-to-allow-genericdrugmakers-to-make-label-changes-independent-of-innovators (last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
229. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Bartlett, 133 S.
Ct. 2466 (12-142).
230. See Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (holding that design-defect claims, like New Hampshire’s,
that place a duty to alter composition or labeling for safety requirements conflict with federal law,
and therefore cannot stand); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12142) (asserting that the Supreme Court is tasked with deciding whether precedent would be
expanded to preempt state law design-defect claims); Brief of John and Tammy Gilbert et al. as
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broader question of whether state tort liability should be employed as “a
complementary form of drug regulation”231 was saved for another day, and
it appears that such a day will at least be scheduled for debate.
The stated purpose of the FDA’s proposed rules is to “create parity”
between brand name drug manufacturers and generic manufacturers,
allowing generics to alter the drug label to include information (including
warnings) specific to the generic product.232 In so doing, the presumption
is that generic manufacturers would avoid the pitfalls and protections of
Bartlett and PLIVA, assuming responsibility for their label, and thus the
liability as well.233 Of course, the devil of the proposed change is in the
details, and the FDA will also be cognizant of the costs and incentives
involved with bringing generic products to market.234 Moreover, if the
FDA’s goal is to “create parity,” then it can be expected that interested
parties will raise the issue of parity between FDA-approved drugs and
medical devices, particularly since there are a growing number of
therapeutics where the distinction between drug and device is increasingly
blurred.235
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 22, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (stating that
the Supreme Court has previously always held narrow circumscription of conflict preemption
based on impossibility); Brief of the Council of State Governments as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 19–20, Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (No. 12-142) (noting that unlike previous
decisions involving failure-to-warn claims, the present case involved the issue of whether federal
law preempts design-defect claims).
231. Brief for the United States, supra note 229, at 34 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555,
578 (2009)).
232. Burton, supra note 226.
233. See Toni Clark & Andrew Hay, FDA Defends Generic Drug Label Proposal at U.S.
House
Hearing,
REUTERS
(April
1,
2014,
6:58
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/genericdrugs-idUSL1N0MT1IV20140401 (stating that
the Supreme Court in 2011 ruled that manufacturers of generic drugs would not be liable for
failure-to-warn against risk, and the FDA now would “unshackle” these manufacturers, exposing
them to liability).
234. See Kurt R. Karst, Generic Drug Labeling Preemption: The Flavor of the Day, FDA LAW
BLOG
(March
10,
2014),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2014/03/generic-drug-labelingpreemption-the-flavor-of-the-day.html (noting that the FDA published a Preliminary Regulatory
Impact Analysis addressing some cost concerns raised by lawmakers, and argued that the change
would incentivize generic manufacturers to warn of safety risks).
235. See Lisa M. Mottes, The Need For Federal Preemption of State Tort Claims in the
Context of "New Drugs" and Premarket-Approved Medical Devices, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 723,
725 (2011) (stating that a call for safety has been initiated as a result of these cases and Congress
has indicated there should be a uniform standard of no preemption). Consider, for example,
nanomedicine—the application of nanotechnology to medicine—which enables the development
of drug carriers that passively target tumors and deliver and dispense chemotherapeutics for
cancer treatment. See Frederick A. Fielder & Glenn H. Reynolds, Legal Problems of
Nanotechnology: An Overview, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 593, 607–08 (1993-1994) (describing
how nanotechnology-based treatments do not fit neatly into the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act’s definitions of either “drug” or “device”); see also Jennifer H. Grossman & Scott E. McNeil,
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FDA PREEMPTION AND MEDICAL DEVICES
Express Preemption: Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.

As discussed earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court treats drugs and medical
devices differently with respect to federal preemption of state product
liability laws.236 In the 2008 matter of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,237 the
Court found that the FDCA, including its Medical Device Amendments
(“MDA”),238 provides the exclusive enforcement mechanism to establish
the safety of medical devices “approved” by the FDA.239 Thus, the MDA
arguably creates express240 preemption for medical devices by statute,
rebutting the usual presumption against federal preemption of state law for
matters involving consumer health and safety:
(a) General Rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State of
political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement—
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement under
this chapter to the device, and

Nanotechnology in Cancer Medicine, 65 PHYSICS TODAY, Aug. 2012, at 38, 38 (Aug. 2012)
(explaining how nanotechnology is applied to medicine to enable the development of drug carriers
that passively target tumors and deliver and dispense chemotherapeutics for cancer treatment).
236. See supra Part I.
237. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
238. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2012).
239. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323–24 (stating that federal requirements specific to a medical
device preempts common-law causes of action for negligence and strict liability (citing Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 512 (1996)).
240. See Indus. Truck. Ass’n v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that in
the past, federal courts have recognized three types of preemption: express, field, and conflict, the
latter two categories being subcategories of implied preemption).
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(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter.241 (Emphasis added.)
Some courts have interpreted the phrase “different from, or in addition
to” only in reference to the duty of care, precluding the imposition of a
higher state-law duty, but allowing state-law damages to be “tacked on”;242
other courts have interpreted it to preclude either a higher duty of care or
additional (state law) damages.243
While acknowledging the important rationale for vesting the FDA with
exclusive authority over the approval process for drugs and medical
devices, there remains, of course, the other side to the story. The FDA is
equipped with a broad range of enforcement mechanisms for
noncompliance with the MDA.244 Once again, however, none of these
enforcement mechanisms include a private right of action that would enable
an injured plaintiff to be compensated for her injury.245 The resultant shield
not only denies reasonable redress to an injured plaintiff, but it also negates
an important incentive for manufacturers to address the dangers posed by
the use of their devices. It also provides a disincentive for becoming
forthcoming and transparent about known or reasonably anticipated
risks.246
In Riegel, the plaintiffs brought a damages action under New York law
alleging that the catheter that ruptured in the lead plaintiff’s coronary artery
was inflated to a pressure that was higher than the Class III label indicated,

241. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
242. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (holding that states are not prevented from providing a
damages remedy on the basis of a violation of FDA regulations); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 495 (1996) (holding that the MDA does not deny states the right to prove traditional
damages remedy for violations of duties parallel to federal requirements); Chambers v. Osteonics
Corp., 109 F.3d 1243, 1248 (1997) (holding that a negligence claim for violating FDA regulations
could be upheld because it did not impose greater requirements that the FDA itself imposed).
243. See, e.g., Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the
language broadly preempts any state tort law, regardless of whether the manufacturer has in fact
complied with the federal standard).
244. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 333–335c (2006) (listing penalties—
criminal, civil, and regulatory—for noncompliance).
245. Id. (including criminal, civil, and regulatory penalties, but lacking a provision for a
private right of action).
246. James W. Matthew et al., New FDA Rule on Drug Labeling May Mean Increased
Exposure and an Uncertain Path for Generic Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 81 DEF. COUNS. J.
306, 309 (2014) (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,985, 67,988–89 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013))
(stating that generic drug manufacturers lack incentives to comply with FDA requirements and to
maintain current safety information for their products).
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which was approved by the FDA.247 The plaintiffs’ state-law products
liability action alleged that the catheter was defective.248 The Supreme
Court in Riegel denied the claim, finding that the MDA expressly
preempted the plaintiffs’ state law claim because it would impose a
standard of care that is greater than the safety requirements required by
federal (FDA) regulations.249 The defendant argued that under such
circumstances, the legislature, in enacting the MDA, believed that it would
be counter-productive to require manufacturers to be beholden to multiple
different state-specific tort law regimes, some of which imposed a duty
greater than the FDA.250
The Riegel Court thus concluded, specifically pursuant to the MDA,
that a product, having been approved by the FDA, could not be held to a
state law standard that was “different from, or in addition to” the standard
set forth under federal law.251 In so holding, however, the Court expressly
reaffirmed its 1996 holding in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr252 that § 510 K of the
MDA (which states that medical devices can be “cleared” pursuant to a less
onerous approval standard for devices substantially equivalent to a preexisting device) does not preclude “traditional damages remed[ies] for
common law duties when those duties parallel federal requirements.”253
The critical point is that the state law damages sought in Lohr (but not
Riegel) were based upon a standard that was consistent with, and parallel
to, the standards required under federal law.254
While Riegel found, pursuant to the MDA, that liability under state
law for the alleged product defect would be denied, the issue continues to
linger. In particular, several subsequent federal courts have attempted to
parse the scope of “implied” preemption in deciding whether all state law
claims are preempted, or just those that are “different from, or in addition
to” those available under the federal law.255 Riegel, which spoke to express

247. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 320 (2008) (stating that the plaintiffs, husband
and wife, brought suit for injuries to the husband allegedly caused by a defective catheter).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 325.
250. Brief for Respondent at 42–43, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008) (No. 06179) (arguing that Congress enacted a uniform federal regulatory framework to shield device
manufacturers from conflicting regulatory requirements and from liability for devices that the
FDA has found safe and effective).
251. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 325.
252. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
253. Id. at 495.
254. Id. (asserting that nothing in § 360(k) denies Florida the ability to provide a damages
remedy, even if it is literally different from the federal rules, as it is not an additional or different
requirement and only serves to provide more incentive to comply with federal rules).
255. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323, 330. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341
(2001) (dismissing a state law claim for failure to make a parallel claim); Carrelo v. Advanced
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preemption, arguably left open the possibility that a tort claim could be
brought under principles of implied preemption as to a state law that
“parallels” federal law, which does not impose duties that are “different
from, or in addition to” those available pursuant to federal law.256 In Lohr,
Justice Breyer emphasized this point in his concurrence, noting that he did
not “find any indication that either Congress or the FDA intended the
relevant FDA regulations to occupy entirely any relevant field.”257
Latching onto this distinction, a number of cases have been brought in
federal courts that interpreted Riegel, Lohr, and a third opinion, Buckman
Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee,258 regarding implied preemption.259
B.

Implied Preemption: Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee

In many respects, the preemption issue continues to surface because
the Riegel Court, while clearly articulating the principles of “express”
preemption of medical devices pursuant to § 360(k) of the MDA, left open
the scope (and thus limits) of the so-called “implied” preemption.260 The
U.S. Supreme Court in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee
previously addressed this nuance in great detail,261 but its interpretation has
subsequently been disputed.262
In Buckman, the plaintiffs claimed that their injuries were a result of
bone screws that had been used on their spines.263 They brought a civil
action in federal court against Buckman Co., a consulting company that
assisted the manufacturer of the screws in “navigating the federal regulatory

Neuromodulation Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 303 (D.P.R. 2011) (avoiding preemption by
successfully pleading a failure-to-warn, a parallel claim); Covert v. Stryker Corp., No.
1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2009) (discussing cases upholding and
denying preemption post-Riegel).
256. Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (holding that parallel claims cannot add to federal requirements
and must be “premised” on FDA regulations).
257. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 508 (Breyer, J., concurring).
258. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
259. See infra Part IV.C.
260. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text.
261. See 531 U.S. at 347–48 (holding that state law fraud on the FDA claims were impliedly
preempted by federal law).
262. Compare Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 98 (2d Cir. 2006) (allowing
parallel claims if the cause of action alleges a state claim other than fraud, by interpreting
Buckman’s holding to limit claims which “solely” assign liability on the basis of fraud), with
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 966 (6th Cir. 2004) (upholding implied preemption
“on the basis of state court findings of fraud,” but allowing the claim when a state “chooses to
incorporate a federal standard into its law of torts . . . when the federal agency itself determines
that fraud marred the regulatory-approval process”).
263. 531 U.S. at 344.
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process for [those] devices.” 264 The plaintiffs alleged that Buckman had
made fraudulent representations to the FDA and that “but for” the false
representations, they would not have been injured.265 The District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed the plaintiffs’ so-called
“fraud-on-the-FDA” claims on the ground that they were preempted by the
MDA.266 A divided panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
concluding that there was no preemption.267 On appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Buckman majority reversed the circuit panel, finding
preemption on the basis that the claims under state law must “inevitably
conflict” with the FDA’s obligation to police this type of fraud.268
Furthermore, allowing this type of claim could impose a chilling effect on
the pre- and post-marketing information provided to the FDA, resulting in
the FDA being hampered in its efforts to evaluate applications for
approval.269 A concurring opinion emphasized the plaintiffs’ inability to
establish the “but for” causation that they alleged.270
Among the current controversy within the circuits is the reach of
Buckman’s implied preemption for claims of “fraud-on-the-FDA.”
Specifically, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits271 have since ruled that
Buckman only preempts specific fraud-on-the-FDA claims where such
claims interfere with the exclusive authority of the FDA to enforce matters
pursuant to the FDCA.272 Those that interpret Buckman to preempt all state
court actions would preclude all traditional failure-to-warn and warranty
claims when the alleged action violates a matter that the FDCA
regulates.273 Those that interpret Buckman more narrowly find that socalled “parallel” state claims are not preempted.274 Parallel state claims are
those that impose the same duties of care on the defendant—they merely
add a state law damage action for failure to comply with the federal duty.275

264. Id.
265. Id. at 347.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 347, 350.
269. Id. at 349–51.
270. Id. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring).
271. See Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013); Hughes v. Boston
Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011); Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir.
2010).
272. See infra Part IV.C.
273. See infra text accompanying notes 297–316 (discussing cases that held that state failureto-warn claims are preempted by federal law).
274. See infra text accompanying notes 317–35 (discussing cases which narrowly interpreted
Buckman and held that some parallel state claims are not preempted).
275. Easterling v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 986 F. Supp. 366, 371 (E.D. La. 1997) (citing
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)).
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For example, a federal court in the Eastern District of Louisiana found as
follows:

any claim based on the [federally regulated devices’]
construction or composition, design, warnings, or express
warranties would each specifically impose requirements
different from or in addition to the FDA-approved
requirements for the device.276
Such cases asserted state law tort theories such as failure-to-warn,
manufacturing defects, breach of implied warranty, fraud,
misrepresentation, etc.277 To date, several cases have reached the U.S.
Court of Appeals and the legal conclusions are mixed.278 In light of the
deep split of opinion among the circuit courts, the issue is poised to
precipitate a definitive review by the U.S. Supreme Court.279
C.

Analysis: Splitting the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits

One of the most recent cases to weigh in on the scope of implied
preemption under Riegel, Lohr, and Buckman is a 2013 decision from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stengel v. Medtronic
Inc.280 In Stengel, the FDA had issued pre-marketing approval for
implantable pain pumps and catheters that are used to deliver medication to
a surgical site in the vicinity of the spinal cord.281 Richard Stengel was a
patient who had a Medtronic pump and catheter inserted, but soon thereafter

276. Hinkel v. St. Jude Med., S.C., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 739, 747 (E.D. La. 2012).
277. See Covert v. Stryker Corp., No. 1:08CV447, 2009 WL 2424559, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Aug.
5, 2009) (listing cases that have held preemption of state law claims).
278. Compare Stengel v. Medtronic, Inc., 704 F.3d 1224, 1228–32 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding
that the Lohr, Buckman, and Riegel Supreme Court decisions do not preempt parallel state claims),
and Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 711 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a parallel fraud claim
was properly raised), and Hughes v. Boston Scientific Corp., 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011)
(reversing a lower court decision, stating that the plaintiff successfully raised a parallel fraud
claim not preempted by federal law), and Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding that a state action based on an alleged violation of federal law is not preempted), with
Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a state fraud on the
FDA cause of action was preempted).
279. See infra Part IV.C.
280. 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013).
281. Id. at 1227.
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lost strength and sensation in his legs.282 Although testing was done to
determine the cause, Stengel’s treating physician did not timely seek or
detect the presence of a granuloma that was ultimately determined to have
caused Stengel’s then-permanent paraplegia.283 Meanwhile, the FDA, in
conducting a routine audit, discovered numerous unreported adverse events
concerning this pump and catheter—including granulomas—and issued a
“Warning Letter” to Medtronic, thus requiring Medtronic to distribute
urgent warning letters to physicians who were using the products.284
Medtronic was subsequently also forced to issue supplemental warnings
before the FDA eventually recalled the products.285
Stengel alleged that had his physician been timely notified by
Medtronic of its post-marketing discovery of dangerous granulomas as
required by the FDA, his physician would have tested for granuloma and
Stengel’s permanent injury would have been avoided.286 Medtronic
countered that Stengel’s lawsuit is exactly the type of state tort claim
contemplated under Riegel’s preemption doctrine: Arizona’s damages
provision would impose a legal standard that is “different from, or in
addition to” the FDA’s pre-marketing approval process of the pump and
catheter, the very criteria set forth in Riegel.287
The unanimous en banc court in Stengel288 (overturning an earlier
opinion of a 3-judge panel) examined Riegel and the MDA to conclude that
“[s]tate requirements are preempted under the MDA only to the extent that
they are ‘different from, or in addition to’ the requirements imposed by
federal law.”289 Thus, the court interpreted these cases to allow “parallel”
state damage claims that that are neither different from nor in addition to
those of the FDCA.290 The court relied substantially upon the Supreme
Court’s decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,291 which found that § 360(k) of
the MDA does not preclude “traditional” common law tort remedies to the
extent that they are not inconsistent with federal requirements.292 The
Stengel court found that there was enough ambiguity in the Lohr, Buckman,
282. Id.
283. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 676 F.3d 1159, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013).
284. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1227.
285. Id.
286. Stengel, 676 F.3d at 1161.
287. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1226, 1230.
288. Id. at 1226. Initially, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held (2-1)
for Medtronic. Stengel was then granted a rehearing en banc, in which the court reversed and
remanded the decision of the three-judge panel. Id.
289. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 1230 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)(1)).
290. Id. at 1226.
291. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
292. See id. at 491 (explaining that a sweeping preemption of “traditional” common-law
remedies was not intended by the legislature).
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and Riegel precedent to avoid concluding that Congress and the FDA
intended to “deprive the States of any role in protecting consumers from the
dangers inherent in many medical devices.”293
Latching on to this distinction between express and implied
preemption, the en banc Ninth Circuit allowed the plaintiff to bring his
state-law “failure to warn” claims for injuries resulting from an FDAapproved medical device.294 The court specifically limited its reach to
circumstances where state law does not impose safety requirements that are
“different from, or in addition to” those required by the FDA.295 In so
concluding, the Stengel court commented:
Given the ambiguities in the statute and the scope of the
preclusion that would occur otherwise . . . we cannot accept
Medtronic’s argument that . . . Congress clearly signaled its
intent to deprive the States of any role in protecting
consumers from the dangers inherent in many medical
devices.296
On this preemption issue, Stengel stands substantially in unison with
the MDA cases in the Fifth and Seventh circuits, which decided that parallel
state-law claims are not preempted.297 In Hughes v. Boston Scientific
Corp.,298 for example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
Boston Scientific’s alleged negligent failure to report “serious injuries” and
“malfunctions” of the device as required by the FDA (and deemed negligent
under Mississippi state tort law) would not be preempted.299 The Fifth
Circuit held similarly in Bass v. Stryker,300 stating that negligence claims
premised upon failure-to-warn claims would be preempted, but not those
based upon negligence in manufacturing.301 Similarly, in Bausch v. Stryker
Corp.,302 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the alleged

293. Stengel, 704 F.3d at 123 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489).
294. Id. at 1233–34.
295. Id. at 1233.
296. Id. (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 489).
297. See Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div. Inc., 442 F.3d 919, 932 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the Louisiana statute went beyond scope of federal requirements, and related claims were
preempted); Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 107 F.3d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
Indiana negligence claim was not preempted by the MDA).
298. 631 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2011).
299. Id. at 771.
300. 669 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2012).
301. Id. at 518.
302. 630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010).
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defective manufacture of a device in violation of the MDA’s manufacturing
regulations would not be preempted.303
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Howard v. Zimmer, Inc.304
reached a similar conclusion despite a circuitous procedural route.305
Howard’s initial appeal occurred in the Sixth Circuit through multidistrict
litigation, but eventually landed in the Tenth Circuit, which certified the
preemption question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.306 Howard involved
a knee replacement (implant) that supposedly failed, and required removal
due to the implant’s inability to bond with the plaintiff’s bone.307 The
purported cause of the failure was an oily residue left on the device, which
was in violation of the manufacturing standards required by the FDA.308
The plaintiff alleged that the violation of the manufacturing standard
constituted negligence per se.309 Although the defendant urged that
negligence per se cannot be predicated upon violation of a regulation
(instead of a statute), the Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed.310 It
established that (1) Oklahoma law does permit a private party (plaintiff) to
assert a parallel claim for negligence per se, and (2) negligence per se can
be based upon violation of a regulation when the enforcement of the
regulation falls within the function of a governmental entity.311
In contrast to Stengel, Hughes, Bausch, and Howard, appellate
courts in the Sixth and Eighth circuits issued opinions that were somewhat
at odds with the narrow interpretation of their sister circuits.312 In Garcia
v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs,313 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that
Buckman prohibits reliance on findings of the state court to establish that a
defendant manufacturer misrepresented or withheld important safety data
303. Id. at 552.
304. 718 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2013).
305. See Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 299 P.3d 463, 466 (Okla. 2013) (describing the case as
involving a “long and tortured litigation trail”).
306. Id.
307. Id. at 465–66; see also id. at 466 n.6 (explaining that although “Zimmer, Inc.” is the
defendant in the case, the name “Sulzer” was used to describe the manufacturer throughout the
litigation).
308. Howard, 299 P.3d at 466. The pre-marketing approval application for this Class III device
required specific manufacturing procedures to “ensure that it is removed or limited to an amount
that does not adversely affect the device’s quality.” 21 C.F.R. § 820.70(h) (2014).
309. Howard, 299 P.3d at 466.
310. Id. at 469, 472.
311. Id. at 471–73.
312. See Fulgenzi v. PLIVA, Inc., 711 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the duty-to-warn
claim was not preempted); Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the failure-to-warn and manufacturer’s instructions claims were preempted); Kemp v. Medtronic,
Inc., 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that negligence per se, fraud, and failure-to-warn
claims were preempted).
313. 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004).
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from the FDA.314 Though not entirely on point, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals in In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads Products Liability
Litigation315 characterized the claims under state law, which stated that the
FDA was not provided with adequate information, and were “simply an
attempt by private parties to enforce the MDA.”316
Since early 2013, a number of lower courts,317 several in the Ninth
circuit,318 and the Oklahoma Supreme Court319 have followed the Stengel
precedent.320 For example, the federal district court for the central district
of California followed Stengel in the matter of Simmons v. Boston Scientific
Corp. et al.321 In Simmons, a defibrillator allegedly malfunctioned, causing
injury to the plaintiff.322 The defendants, of course, argued that the
plaintiff’s claim was preempted under Riegel and the MDA.323 In an effort
to overcome Riegel preemption, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants
also violated parallel state law duties, including failure-to-warn, pursuant to
the recent Stengel precedent.324 The district court recognized that in the
absence of Stengel, Riegel preemption likely would have prevailed since the
defendant argued it would be required to “give warnings to patients or
physicians different from or broader than those required by FDA
regulations.”325 Although the Simmons court recognized that the plaintiff’s
claims might now prevail under Stengel, the plaintiffs ultimately failed
anyway on procedural grounds.326
The split among the circuits concerning the scope of MDA preemption
focuses squarely on the issue of whether both implied preemption under the

314. Id. at 966; see also Cupek v. Medtronic, Inc., 405 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
claim of negligence per se would be preempted under the MDA).
315. 623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010).
316. Id. at 1205–06.
317. See Messner v. Medtronic, Inc., 975 N.Y.S.2d 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (unpublished
opinion); Burgos v. Satiety, Inc., No. 10-CV-2680 (MKB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31062, at *1
(E.D.N.Y., March 5, 2013).
318. See Perez v. Nidek Co., 711 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013); Phelps v. Wyeth, Inc., 938 F.
Supp. 2d 1055 (D. Or. 2013); Elliot v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 112-CV-0070-EJL-MHW,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59072, at *1 (D. Idaho, June 11, 2013).
319. See Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 299 P.3d 463 (Okla. 2013); see also supra notes 304–11 and
accompanying text.
320. Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013).
321. No. CV 12-7962 PA (FFMx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45852, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25,
2013).
322. Id. at *1–2.
323. Id. at *6–7.
324. Id. at *13–14.
325. See id. at *9–10 (explaining that Stengel allows state claims that are broader than those
required by FDA if those state claims are based on the defendant’s failure-to-warn the FDA of the
adverse health consequences of its medical device).
326. Id. at *14, *16.
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rationale set forth in Buckman, (“this sort of litigation would exert an
extraneous pull on the scheme established by Congress and is therefore preempted”327) and express preemption under Riegel (the FDA “may . . .
approve devices that present great risks if they nonetheless offer great
benefits in light of the available alternatives”328) leaves room for the
“parallel” cause of action identified in Stengel, Hughes, and Bausch.329
Riley v. Cordis Corp.,330 a federal district court opinion from the
district of Minnesota, provides a thoughtful interpretation of Buckman,
Lohr, and Riegel, concluding that there is only a “narrow gap” of medical
device cases that would survive MDA preemption.331 Specifically, the court
determined that “[t]he plaintiff must be suing for conduct that violates the
FDCA (or else his claim is expressly preempted by § 360(k)(a)), but the
plaintiff must not be suing because the conduct violates the FDCA (since
such a claim would be impliedly preempted under Buckman).”332 So, for
example, parallel state law claims that allege misrepresentation or
nondisclosure (whether fraudulent or negligent) might fit through the Riley
“narrow gap” since “the state-law claim is in substance . . . a claim for
violating the FDCA—that is, when the state claim would not exist if the
FDCA did not exist.”333 Furthermore, Riley decided that state law claims
“premised on conduct that both (1) violates the FDCA and (2) would give
rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the FDCA” may
survive preemption under Buckman.334 The courts in the Hughes, Bausch,
and Stengel cases may have gone further, finding that so-called parallel
state-law damage claims are not preempted, except to the extent that they
clearly assert “fraud on the FDA.”335
V.

MDA, PREEMPTION, AND OFF-LABEL USE OF MEDICAL DEVICES

327. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).
328. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 318 (2008).
329. See Jean M. Eggen, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis: Preemption of Medical
Device "Parallel Claims", 9 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 159, 184–86, 208–09 (2013) (citing
Stengel, Hughes and Bausch as examples of circuit court cases in which parallel manufacturing
claims were not preempted).
330. 625 F. Supp. 2d 769 (D. Minn. 2009).
331. Id. at 777; see also Eggen, supra note 329, at 200 (“[S]ome courts have correctly inferred
from Lohr, Riegl, and Buckman that all properly pleaded parallel claims, other than those narrowly
asserting fraud on the FDA, survive express preemption . . . .”).
332. Riley, 625 F. Supp. 2d at 777.
333. Id. (citing Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352–53).
334. Id.
335. See Eggen, supra note 329, at 184–85, 208–09 (citing Hughes, Bausch, and Stengel as
examples of claims that would smoothly navigate the narrow gap and survive preemption).
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A related issue that is yet unresolved is whether off-label uses of
medical devices would survive MDA preemption.336 On the one hand,
Buckman contemplated the burden that manufacturers face in seeking
marketing approval each time a “reasonable” off-label use is
contemplated;337 on the other hand, medical devices that are granted
through pre-marketing approval (even on the basis of false, misleading, or
incomplete information) for one use can do significant damage in the
medical setting if used differently.338 With broad implied preemption,
device manufacturers might be faced with an incentive to seek FDA
approval for the most minimal contemplated use—and thereafter market the
product for additional, perhaps largely untested, uses—with impunity.339
A recent example of an alleged off-label use of a medical device that a
state court determined might fit through the MDA “implied preemption”
window concerned use of products that included INFUSE—a genetically
engineered protein that has been widely used in spinal surgeries—and is
currently the subject of a congressional investigation.340 In Cabana v.
Stryker Biotech, LLC and Medtronic, Inc.,341 a state court action in
California, the plaintiff, April Cabana, claimed that she initially suffered
permanent, debilitating injuries in her spinal column as a result of two
products (Calstrux and OP-l) manufactured by Stryker that were mixed
together in a manner not approved by the FDA.342 Cabana alleged that
Stryker promoted use of the products off-label, knowing that doing so could
result in harm.343 Stryker was subsequently indicted in federal court for
illegal marketing of the products, and two of its sales managers pled guilty
to off-label promotion.344 In a subsequent surgery to address her poor
result, Cabana alleged that the surgeon used a Medtronic INFUSE bone

336. See id. at 172–73, 186 (explaining that off-label use of medical devices is another area in
which lower courts have inconsistently analyzed parallel claims under the preemption doctrine).
337. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350.
338. See Eggen, supra note 329, at 210 (explaining the factors to be considered in deciding
whether to preempt claims that are based on a manufacturer’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure).
339. See id. at 203 (explaining that preemption rules that are broadly applied would shield
device manufacturers from liability, and would remove the incentive to actively engage in postmarketing vigilance).
340. See Deena Beasley, Medtronic Bone Graft has Limited Benefit, May Cause Harm:
Reviews, REUTERS, (June 18, 2013, 3:35 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/06/17/usmedtronic-spine-graft-idINBRE95G14Z20130617 (stating that in 2011, INFUSE, Medtronic’s
product, became the subject of a congressional investigation when Medtronic failed to disclose
safety problems in the clinical trial data and over its off-label use).
341. No. BC465313, 2012 WL 3876245 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. United States v. Stryker Biotech LLC, Crim. No. 09-10330-GAO, 2010 WL 2900684 (D.
Mass. July 21, 2010).
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graft, also off-label, which failed to correct her condition.345 It was later
reported in The Spine Journal that Medtronic failed to accurately report the
side effects from the clinical trials, and that many of the investigators who
worked on the studies had significant financial ties to Medtronic.346
Medtronic defended its action on the basis that Cabana’s claim should
be expressly preempted by the MDA since the devices received premarketing approval by the FDA.347 In refusing to dismiss the matter, the
California trial court concluded that because it is alleged that defendants
“promoted the use of its devices in violation of federal requirements. . . .
Riegel is not authority that plaintiff’s claims . . . are preempted here.”348 In
support of Cabana’s claim that the INFUSE device was used off-label and
therefore in violation of its FDA approval, Cabana offered evidence that
Medtronic used a paid consultant to train her own physician in use of the
bone graft for this off-label application.349 In 2012, Medtronic settled for
$85 million in a shareholder lawsuit, which alleged that Medtronic had
failed to divulge that more than 85% of INFUSE sales were based upon offlabel uses.350
VI.

CONCLUSION: “PARALLEL” CLAIMS AS AN INTERIM MEASURE
TOWARD PARITY FOR DRUGS AND DEVICES

In the context of medical devices, three U.S. Supreme Court cases351
create the foundation for federal preemption under the FDCA, and
specifically, the possibility of parallel state claims. These cases, because
they are governed by the MDA, follow a different path from the Supreme
Court cases that guide federal preemption in the context of FDA-approved
drugs.352 To summarize the issue as to medical devices, Lohr determined
that the FDCA does not preempt “a traditional damages remedy for
violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel federal
requirements.”353 Buckman supports the bringing of state law tort claims to
the extent that a plaintiff “rel[ies] on traditional state tort law[,]” but rejects

345. Cabana, 2012 WL 3876245.
346. Beasley, supra note 340.
347. Cabana, 2012 WL 3876245.
348. Id.
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350. Beasley, supra note 340.
351. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
352. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567
(2011); Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
353. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.
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such claims if the FDCA provides “a critical element in [the] case.”354 In
order to determine whether a state-law claim could prevail, Riegel provides
the guidance, albeit in the context of drugs. There, the Court established a
test for determining whether a state-law tort claim could proceed: it would
ask whether state law imposes a safety requirement that is “different from,
or in addition to” the federal requirement.355 This concept of a “parallel”356
claim now awaits more precise definition by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Until that time, the circuit courts in Bausch,357 Hughes,358 and, most
recently, Stengel,359 can stand for the principle that it is yet unclear whether
the FDCA actually intended to impose different tort rules for drugs and
devices, particularly where state and federal law duties are parallel to one
another. Stengel, in particular, refused to reach what would otherwise be
the inevitable conclusion that Congress intended to “deprive the States of
any role in protecting consumers from the dangers inherent in many
medical devices.”360 The government argued as much in its amicus curiae
brief in Stengel, wherein it explicitly challenged the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of parallel claims.361 Curiously, however, at the
same time, it also successfully took a position against certiorari in the U.S.
Supreme Court where the issues might have been vetted and resolved. So
while the MDA in recent years has largely shielded medical device
manufacturers from liability pursuant to state tort law, it now appears that
the climate is shifting, and it is only a matter of time before there is more
activity in the circuit courts that lead to another case making its way to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Until that time, Stengel provides compelling
arguments, including the voice of the government, in favor of allowing
state-law tort claims against manufacturers of medical devices.
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